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Territorial behaviour can only be adaptive if its costs are outweighed by its beneﬁts. Territorial
individuals incur costs by defending their territories against intruders. Usually these intruders are
assumed to be non-territorial ﬂoaters attempting to take over the whole territory or neighbours trying
to extend the borders of their own territory. We instead investigate how costs and beneﬁts of territorial
behaviour are affected by neighbours which invade to steal resources on a territory.
We show analytically that in the absence of defence intrusion into neighbouring territories always
pays and that even if territories are defended intrusion levels can still be high. Using a more detailed
simulation model we ﬁnd that territory defence usually disappears from the population even if owners
have a strong advantage over intruders in terms of ﬁghting costs or foraging efﬁciency. Defence and
thus territoriality can only be evolutionarily stable if ﬁghting costs for the intruder relative to the
productivity of the territory are very high or if crossing the borders between territories carries
additional costs.
Our results show that stealing of resources by neighbours can have a considerable effect on the
evolutionary stability of territory defence and thus territoriality itself. A more mechanistic model of
territorial behaviour is needed to incorporate these kinds of mechanisms into a general theory on the
evolution of territoriality.
& 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Territoriality is one of the most conspicuous ways in which
access to local resources such as food or nest sites can be
organised in animal populations. Territoriality is a situation where
many or all of the individuals in a population claim ownership of a
piece of the available space in the sense that they have exclusive
access to the resources it contains (Maher and Lott, 1995). Due to
ubiquitous competition for resources this claim has to be
defended against other individuals in the population (Malthus,
1798; Brown, 1964). Territorial behaviour can therefore only be
adaptive if maintenance of ownership is proﬁtable, i.e. if the
defence of a territory is less expensive in terms of ﬁtness than the
potential damage done by competitors in the absence of defence
(Brown, 1964; Schoener, 1987).
The main focus in the study of the adaptiveness of territoriality
has in the past been on the competition between owners and
non-territorial intruders (ﬂoaters) either for entire territoriesll rights reserved.
efﬁeld, UK.
insch),(e.g. Maynard Smith and Parker, 1976; Eshel and Sansone, 1995;
Yee, 2003; Lo´pez-Sepulcre and Kokko, 2005; Gintis, 2007) or for
resources within the territory (e.g. Gill and Wolf, 1975; Davies,
1980; Schoener, 1987).
The consequences of the competition between territorial
neighbours have also been explored, although less thoroughly
(Adams, 2001). Most models of neighbour–neighbour interactions
assume that conﬂicts arise from individuals attempting to
increase the size of their territories at their neighbours’ expense
and investigate how the position of the border between two (non-
overlapping) territories is negotiated by the respective owners
(MaynardSmith, 1982; Pereira et al., 2003; Mesterton-Gibbons
and Adams, 2003). This process can even lead to the exclusion of
some individuals from the territorial population (Parker and
Knowlton, 1980).
Borders of territories are, however, not impenetrable. To
increase its access to resources a territory owner could also intrude
into a neighbour’s territory, effectively ‘‘stealing’’ resources (Vander
Wall and Jenkins, 2003). ‘‘Theft’’ by neighbours can have strong
effects on the costs and beneﬁts of territoriality. In low frequencies
it can reduce the payoff of having a territory while at the same time
increasing the costs of territory defence (e.g. Gill and Wolf, 1979;
Hixon, 1980; Schoener, 1987). A high incidence of theft would
ultimately render territory borders meaningless and would
therefore effectively lead to the disappearance of territoriality.
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territory owners can make intrusion into territories costly enough
that individuals will restrict themselves to foraging mostly or
entirely within their own territories (Adler and Gordon, 2003;
Morrell and Kokko, 2005). Whether owners do defend their
territories against intruding neighbours on the other hand will
depend on the amount of damage done by these intruders relative
to the costs (and chances of success) of defence (Brown, 1964;
Schoener, 1987).
Whether territoriality can be maintained when theft of
resources by neighbours is possible therefore clearly depends on
a combination of the economics of both, intrusion and defence
against intruders. We would expect that territoriality should
break down if either defence is not sufﬁcient to discourage
neighbours from intruding or intrusion is too frequent to make
defence worth wile. On the other hand territoriality should be
self-sustaining if it pays for owners to defend their territories and
this defence at the same time makes intrusion costly enough that
individuals do not trespass into their neighbours’ territories.
In this study we investigate under which conditions stealing of
resources by neighbours poses a threat to the evolutionary stability
of territory defence and when the coevolution of defence and
respect for ownership leads to the maintenance of territoriality.
We use a simple analytical model and amore detailed individual-
based simulation to derive our results. In the models we directly
track the ﬁtness costs of defence and intrusion. We implement
simple resource dynamics to determine the payoff of stealing and
the effects of exploitation competition. We investigate which level of
territory defence by the neighbour is sufﬁcient to make stealing
unproﬁtable, and whether the potential damage done by intruding
neighbours is enough to make defence proﬁtable.
This allows us to predict under which conditions territoriality,
that is a combination of low intrusion and high defence can be
evolutionarily stable even if potential intrusion by neighbours is
taken into account.
We will ﬁrst present the basic version of our model which is
simple enough to be analysed mathematically. Then we use a
qualitatively equivalent spatially explicit individual-based simu-
lation model to test the validity of some simplifying assumptions
and to explore some interesting extensions of the basic model.Table 1
Model parameters.
Evolving traits
i Rate of intrusion
e Rate of return
a Probability to attack an intruder
Derived values
I Proportion of time spent intruding
D Average number of individuals on a territory
to Average duration of a stay in the own territory
ti Average duration of an intrusion
Functions
r(D) Uptake rate dependent on average density
Parameters
v Probability that the owner wins a ﬁght
co Fighting costs (owner)
ci Fighting costs (intruder)
N Number of neighbouring territories
d Detection rate of intruders2. The analytical model
Similar to others (e.g. Switzer et al., 2001; Adler and Gordon,
2003; Pereira et al., 2003) we model the ﬁtness consequences of
single foraging decisions of individuals. We assume that every-
thing else being equal an individual with a higher long-term
average resource uptake rate will have a higher ﬁtness. In the
same way ﬁghting in reality can have various negative con-
sequences in terms of energy costs, time investment, predation
risk or risk of injury or death. All of these, however, effectively
lead to a reduction in ﬁtness. In our model we therefore simplify
things by measuring costs and beneﬁts in units of ﬁtness lost or
gained.
For the sake of simplicity we restrict the effects of intrusion to
direct neighbours. In our model individuals therefore at any point
in time forage either on their own territory or intrude into one of
the neighbouring territories. Intrusion, detection by owners and
return to the home territory are assumed to be Poisson processes,
i.e. they occur independently and with a constant probability for a
given period of time. In the analytical model we approximate
these as constant rates.
We ignore the effects of interference competition (with the
exception of ﬁghting costs). The only consequence of intrusion is
therefore depletion of resources. Resources are assumed to slowlyregrow, so that resource level and therefore uptake rate in a
territory depends on the long-term average density of individuals
(owner and all intruders) in that territory.2.1. Model description
Individuals in our model inhabit identical territories with a ﬁxed
number of N neighbours. The proportion of time they spend as
intruders or owners, respectively, as well as the level of aggression in
the population is a result of the interaction of three behavioural
traits: intrusion rate i, aggressiveness a and return rate e.
Individuals intrude into neighbouring territories with rate i
and leave them again – returning to their own territory – either
voluntarily with rate e or because they were detected and chased
away. Intruding individuals can be detected with rate d by the
territory owner which will attack with probability a. If an intruder
loses the ensuing ﬁght (probability v) it returns into its own
territory. Fights are costly for the owner (co) as well as for the
intruder (ci).
The payoff an individual obtains from foraging depends on the
amount of resources in the territory it is currently foraging in.
Similar to other studies (e.g. Waser, 1981; Houston et al., 1985;
Adler and Gordon, 2003) we assume that changes in the amount
of resources are slow enough compared to the movement of
individuals between territories that short term ﬂuctuations in
density have negligible consequences for the uptake rate of
individuals (this assumption is later relaxed in the simulation).
Therefore we approximate foraging success in terms of increase in
ﬁtness as a function r(D) of average number of individuals present
on a territory (henceforth referred to as density) which is equal to
the sum of the average proportions of time all eligible individuals,
i.e. the owner (while at home) and all neighbours (while
intruding) spend on the territory. Since we assume exploitation
competition, r has to be a decreasing function.
We use a continuous time spatially implicit mathematical
model to describe the dynamics of intrusion, defence and
foraging. We analyse evolutionary dynamics within the model
based on a straightforward adaptive dynamics approach (Geritz
et al., 1998).
For a list of all model parameters and variables used, see Table 1.2.2. Fitness
To determine the evolutionary dynamics in the model we
calculate the ﬁtness of a single (or rare) mutant (which by
M. Hinsch, J. Komdeur / Journal of Theoretical Biology 266 (2010) 606–613608deﬁnition is identical to its expected long-term uptake rate minus
costs of ﬁghting) in a homogeneous resident population.
The average proportion of time an individual spends intruding
is denoted as I and can be calculated from the average time spent




Since we approximate the stochastic process with deterministic
rates in continuous time the time spent in a state (after entering









We can therefore derive the proportion of time spent intruding as
Iði,e,aÞ ¼ i
eþ iþadv ð4Þ
For a given territory, density (i.e. average number of individuals
present) D is then just the sum of the proportions of time all
individuals spend there.
We deﬁne ﬁtness as the sum of the beneﬁts gained through
foraging ‘‘at home’’ (proportion of time 1 I) and in somebody
else’s territory (proportion of time I) minus the costs of attacking
and being attacked. In the following all variables associated with
the resident strategy are marked with a ‘ ’^ . If a distinction is
necessary behaviour on the mutant’s territory is marked with a
subscript ‘m’, whereas behaviour taking place on one of the
residents’ territories is denoted by a ‘p’. For the ﬁtness of a single
(or rare) mutant in a homogeneous resident population we obtain
wði,e,aÞ ¼ ð1IÞrðDmÞþ IrðDpÞNI^mdacoIda^ci ð5Þ
In order to be able to calculate foraging success r we have to
determine density on the residents’ and the mutant’s territory, Dp
and Dm, respectively.
The density on a resident’s territory (if it is neighbouring the
territory of the mutant) is the proportion of time the focal
resident is present plus the intrusion by N1 other residents and
the mutant. Assuming for the sake of tractability that the focal
resident’s time at home is not inﬂuenced by the mutant’s
behaviour we obtain







The density on the mutant’s territory consists of the presence
of the mutant itself, 1 I and the density of the resident intruders:
Dmði,e,aÞ ¼ 1IþNI^m ð7Þ
The contribution of resident intruders to density on the mutant’s
territory corresponds to the expected proportion of time each
neighbour will spend intruding on the mutant’s territory I^m times
the number of neighbours. Note that resident neighbours might
spend different amounts of time intruding depending on whether
they intrude into the mutant’s or another resident’s territory (i.e.


























ð8ÞIn the following we simplify our notation by deﬁning the time
unit as 1=d so that d becomes one and can be dropped from all
equations.
2.3. Selection gradients
Assuming that invasion success of the mutant is predicted by
its invasion ﬁtness selection gradients can be calculated as the
derivatives of the mutant’s ﬁtness with respect to the evolving
traits. These gradients and their derivatives can then be used to
ﬁnd evolutionarily singular points and their stability properties
(Geritz et al., 1998).
From Eq. (5) we can calculate the selection gradients
with respect to a, i and e, evaluated at the current resident’s
strategy wua :¼ @w=@ijði,e,aÞ ¼ ðı^ ,e^ ,a^Þ, wue :¼ @w=@ejði,e,aÞ ¼ ðı^ ,e^ ,a^Þ and





























2.4.1. Intrusion and return rate
Since we know that level of intrusion has to increase with i and
decrease with e it follows from Eqs. (9) and (10) that signðwuiÞ ¼
signðwueÞ, which means in particular that wui ¼ 03wue ¼ 0. Thus,
any evolutionarily singular point (sensu 25) for i is also a singular
point for e and vice versa. We further see from Eqs. (9) and (10)
that whether a given combination of i and e is a singularity
depends only on the value of a and the resulting level of intrusion
I. Therefore for each given value of a there has to be a line of
evolutionarily singular different combinations (i,e)* which lead to







The singular point I* turns out to be convergence stable
(assuming negative density dependence ruo0) and continuously
stable if r is concave around 1.
This result can be explained by the fact that the beneﬁts as
well as the costs of intrusion are only a function of the proportion
of time spent on the foreign territory not of the frequency of
switching between territories.
We see that without defence intrusion into neighbouring
territories clearly pays: Setting a to 0 in Eq. (12) leads to I*¼N/
(N+1), i.e. an individual should spend exactly the same amount of
time in its own as in each of its neighbour’s territories. If
territories are defended the amount of intrusion decreases and
can even disappear completely if ﬁghting costs for the intruders
are high, resource production is low or detection rate is high. In
general intrusion increases with the number of neighbours per
territory.
2.4.2. Aggressiveness
We can derive three straightforward conditions describing the
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eþ i4 ð1IÞ vjruð1Þj
co
4e ð14Þ smaller a is selected for ðwuao0Þ if
ð1IÞ vjruð1Þj
co
oe ð15ÞSince a is never convergence stable (see Appendix B) only the
values 0 and 1 can be evolutionary attractors for a.
We see that although for the evolution of intrusion and return
rate only the actual proportion of time spent intruding is relevant,
the evolutionary stability of defence also depends on the
frequency of intrusion events. For the same level of intrusion I,
low intrusion and return rates (i, e) can lead to maintenance of
defence whereas high rates will make it disappear (see Fig. 1).
A closer look at how small changes in the mutant’s aggres-
siveness affect realised ﬁghting costs and foraging success reveals
the underlying mechanism (see Eq. (11)). The sensitivity of
(realised) ﬁghting costs against changes in aggressiveness
depends on intruder density (and therefore on the proportion of
time individuals spend intruding) whereas the sensitivity of
foraging success depends on the change in density with aggres-
siveness.
We can see from Eqs. (3) and (4), however, that under high
switching rates (i.e. high i and e) aggressiveness (and thus change
of aggressiveness) has a much less pronounced effect on density
as well as leaving rates of intruders than under low switching
rates even if the actual intruder density (and therefore attack rate
adI) is the same in both cases. To put it differently: if we assume
two scenarios with the same proportion of time spent intruding
but different frequencies of moving between territories then in
the scenario with the higher frequency of movement a single
intrusion bout of an individual is less likely to have been
terminated by an attack and more likely by voluntary return to
the home territory resulting in weaker effects of aggressiveness.
Therefore the higher switching rates the less effective an
increase in aggressiveness is in reducing levels of intrusion and
consequently exploitation competition by intruders.
We can also see that not surprisingly a high win chance v
furthers the stability of territory defence. Equivalently high
















tability of a dependent on e and i. For values of e and i below the a-
(a¼1: thin solid line; a¼0: thin dashed line) the selection gradient of a is
, in the region above the isoclines it is negative. The area between the
(light grey) leads to bistability. Also shown are the combinations of e and
lead to a stable level of intrusion I for a¼0 (fat dashed line) and a¼1 (fat
e). (N¼4, ci=jruð1Þj ¼ 0:9, co=jruð1Þj ¼ 0:5).on foraging success have a detrimental effect on aggressiveness.
Finally stability of defence increases with the time individuals
spend on their own territory (1 I), since this determines the
degree to which they proﬁt from a decrease in intruder density.3. The simulation model
The mathematical model described above trades realism for
clarity in a number of ways. First, it averages over (stochastic)
differences between individuals with respect to state and genetic
setup. It has been shown that this kind of approximation can
produce strongly misleading results (Huston et al., 1988). Second,
we assume that individuals always encounter equilibrium
resource levels. To test whether these assumptions affect the
behaviour of our model we implemented a spatially explicit
individual-based version of the model. As an added beneﬁt this
allowed us to easily explore two simple extensions of the model
(see below) which would have been difﬁcult to do analytically.3.1. Setup
Territories are placed on a regular grid of size 30 times 30.
Territories to the left, right, above and below are considered
adjacent (thus N¼4)—grid edges are assumed to wrap around
(leading to a torus-shaped world). Each territory is always owned
by exactly one individual.
At the beginning of each time step individuals can switch
territories—either voluntarily or because they are chased away by
owners: In random order they decide whether they want to either
intrude (if currently at home) or return (if currently intruding).
Currently intruding individuals furthermore are detected, at-
tacked and chased away with the respective probabilities (see
analytical model). Subsequently all individuals (again in random
order) feed at their current location. All probabilities are
calculated equivalent to the corresponding rates in the mathe-
matical model. The free parameter detection probability d was
arbitrarily set to 0.1.
To keep things simple we opted for very basic resource
dynamics. Each time step the resource level in each territory is
increased by a ﬁxed amount R. Feeding individuals reduce the
resource level by a ﬁxed proportion f.
After 3000 time steps the population reproduces, generating a
new generation of individuals which completely replaces the old
population. The expected number of offspring of an individual is
determined by its ﬁtness, i.e. the sum of all beneﬁts and costs it
accrued during its lifetime relative to the average population
ﬁtness.3.2. Extensions
In the basic model the only costs to intrusion are the ﬁghting
costs from a potential attack (ci). Apart from that – assuming
equal resource levels – foraging on a foreign territory is exactly
equivalent to foraging at home.
In reality, however, under non-random foraging (e.g. Gill and
Wolf, 1977) the lack of knowledge about foraging schedules
automatically reduces foraging efﬁciency for an intruder and
makes intrusion less desirable (Davies, 1980; Houston et al., 1985).
This effect of ‘‘defence by exploitation’’ can become even stronger
if individuals on purpose adapt their foraging behaviour so as
to make intrusion unproﬁtable for example by foraging dispro-
portionately often near the boundaries of their territories (Davies











Fig. 2. Predicted level of intrusion versus actual intrusion in the basic simulation
model (dashed line ¼ identity). The measured level of intrusion after 10 000
generations is very close to the evolutionarily stable value of I* the mathematical
model predicts based on the evolved level of aggressiveness a in the simulation. All
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that intruders forage at a lower efﬁciency fi than owners.
In addition it is in many situations conceivable that the
movement between territories itself is costly in terms of time,
energy or predation risk. We simulated this by making individuals
pay a ﬁxed amount of energy cs on each return or intrusion.
3.3. Results
For all model variants we varied ﬁghting costs ci and co and
initial values of the traits a, i and e. For each parameter
combination we ran ten replicates for 10000 time steps. For a
list of all parameter combinations used, see Table 2.
In general it turned out that the effect of varying the initial
values of i and e conformed to the expectations, i.e. higher values
decreased the likelihood of the occurrence of defence. Its
magnitude, however, was rather small compared to the effect of
the other parameters. In the following we will therefore only
show the results for i0¼e0¼0.
3.3.1. Equivalence to the mathematical model
All mechanistic aspects of the mathematical model are
reproduced very accurately by the IBM. Given a set of parameters
and trait values we can exactly predict the resulting intrusion
rates, foraging rates and attack rates in the simulation with the
mathematical model (not shown). Similarly the predicted stable
level of intrusion I* corresponds very well to the value reached in
the simulation (see Fig. 2).
On the other hand the evolutionary dynamics of the simulation
differ considerably from the expectations based on the analytical
model. If the starting value of a is 0 territoriality in the simulation
never occurs. For an initial aggressiveness of 1 territoriality is only
kept in runs with very high intrusion costs although variation
between replicates is considerable (Fig. 3a and c). A closer look
shows that although the level of intrusion in the simulation
generally is consistent with the analytical predictions (see above)
the values of e and i undergo strong directional drift towards
higher values. As our mathematical analysis implies (see Fig. 1)
this will lead to a breakdown of territoriality as soon as the
population moves into the unstable zone for high values of e and i.
This unexpected effect can be explained by non-equilibrium
resource dynamics in the individual-based model. The equili-
brium level of resources in a territory depends on the long-term
average number of individuals present which is one. The density
experienced by a focal individual is, however, either one if it is
alone or higher than one if other individuals are present, which
leads to an average higher than one. Therefore on average an
individual will ﬁnd itself in a situation where resource levels (due
to its own and its conspeciﬁcs’ presence) are slowly decreasingTable 2
Parameter values (simulation).
v Probability that the owner wins a ﬁght 0.5
N Number of neighbouring territories 4
d Detection rate (of intruders) 0.1
Basic simulation model
i0 Initial rate of intrusion 0,1
e0 Initial rate of return 0,1
a0 Initial probability to attack an intruder 0,1
co Fighting costs (owner) 0.1, 0.4
ci Fighting costs (intruder) 0.1, 1, 2, y, 5
Owner advantage
fi Foraging efﬁciency of intruders 0.9, 0.5
Switching costs
cs Costs of moving between territories 0.1, 1.0towards levels below equilibrium. The surrounding territories on
the other hand have an average density o1 (since the focal
individual is not present) and are thus moving towards a higher
equilibrium resource level. Individuals therefore proﬁt from
increasing switching rate to avoid local depletion.
3.3.2. Owner advantage
Assuming that intruders forage less efﬁciently than owners
surprisingly does have only little effect on the outcome of the
simulations even for low values of intruder efﬁciency f (see Fig. 3
B,D). The slow increase of e and i over time still leads to the
breakdown of territoriality in most scenarios.
3.3.3. Switching costs
Already moderate switching costs are sufﬁcient to counteract
the selection for higher switching frequency which considerably
stabilises territoriality (Fig. 4a and c). For low ﬁghting costs for the0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5
a*
ci
0 1 2 3 4 5
ci
Fig. 3. Evolved level of aggressiveness a versus ﬁghting costs for the intruder ci for
high (a0¼1, solid line, ﬁlled circles) and low (a0¼0, dashed line, open circles)
values of initial aggressiveness. Results are shown for different values of ﬁghting
costs for the owner (top: c0¼0.1; bottom: co¼0.4) and owner advantage (left: no
owner advantage; right: f¼0.5). High aggressiveness and therefore territoriality
only persists for high intrusion costs and high initial aggressiveness. Owner
advantage and ﬁghting costs for the owner have little effect.











Fig. 4. Evolved level of aggressiveness a versus ﬁghting costs for the intruder ci for
high (a0¼1, solid line, ﬁlled circles) and low (a0¼0, dashed line, open circles)
values of initial aggressiveness. Results are shown for different values of ﬁghting
costs for the intruder (top: co¼0.1; bottom: c0¼0.4) and different switching costs
(left: cs¼0.1; right: cs¼1). Already moderate switching costs strongly favour the
stability and even the emergence of territoriality.
M. Hinsch, J. Komdeur / Journal of Theoretical Biology 266 (2010) 606–613 611owner co territoriality even emerges from a non-territorial
population (Fig. 4a). For high switching costs most populations
end up being territorial independent of initial aggressiveness and
ﬁghting costs (Fig. 4b and d). Interestingly under the presence of
switching costs low ﬁghting costs for the intruder ci seem to
promote rather than hinder territoriality.4. Discussion
Our results show that in territorial populations the incentive
for stealing resources from neighbours can be strong enough that
defence becomes uneconomical and disappears. Only if being
attacked by territory owners has severe ﬁtness consequences for
intruders or if crossing the borders between territories is costly
per se can intrusion levels be kept low enough to enable territory
defence.
In the absence of defence stealing from neighbours is always
proﬁtable in our model since individuals can effectively save up
on their own resources by living off the neighbour’s resources for
some time. This simple and intuitively plausible result leads to
some interesting conclusions. First of all it means that everything
else being equal resource dynamics create a force counteracting
territoriality and furthering the ‘‘diluting’’ of territories by mutual
intrusion. Therefore in general, in order to explain the existence of
territories some additional effect has to be found which
compensates for the proﬁtability of stealing. If we abstract a bit
from the details of our particular model we further see that this
conclusion might even apply to other scenarios of resource
partitioning. In every situation where not using a resource
increases its future value we would similarly expect stealing to
be proﬁtable.
The results of our calculations concerning the selection on
intrusion and defence, respectively, partially conﬁrm earlier
studies. Similar to Adler and Gordon (2003) and Morrell and
Kokko (2005) we ﬁnd that territory defence can prevent intrusion
by making it costly with defence becoming more effective the
higher the ﬁghting costs and the weaker the effects of density
dependence. As previous studies on economic defendability (see
Schoener, 1987) we see in our model that costs and efﬁcacy ofdefence, the gain in terms of reduction of competition and the
amount of intrusion inﬂuence economic defendability. The
combination of both conﬁrms our expectations—without defence
intrusion leads to the complete disappearance of territoriality.
High intrusion levels on the other hand make defence unecono-
mical.
A factor which surprisingly had barely any effect on the
stability of territoriality was the owner advantage in foraging rate.
This is interesting since this has been seen as one of the primary
reasons for the respect of ownership by territorial neighbours
(Davies and Houston, 1981; Possingham, 1989). At least partially
this puzzling result might be explained by the fact that the spatial
distribution of resources within a territory is not represented in
our model. If we assume that intruders forage preferentially close
to their own territory then the depletion they cause will be
concentrated in these areas which might make intrusion less
worthwhile.
An unexpected result from our analytical model was that not
only the absolute level of intrusion but also the frequency of
intrusion events determines the efﬁciency of defence. It turns out
that this effect is quite important. In combination with the fact
that defence results in selection on intrusion levels and not
frequency it causes any factor that affects intrusion frequency to
directly determine the evolutionary stability of territoriality. This
is conﬁrmed by our simulation results. In the scenario most
directly corresponding to the analytical model resource dynamics
lead to a strong enough selection for higher intrusion frequency to
let defence and thus territoriality disappear in nearly all cases.
If movement between territories is costly on the other hand
frequent intrusion is selected against and territoriality becomes
stable. This effect certainly does play a role in natural systems
where territories are large or separated by uninhabited space or
where individuals start their foraging activities from a central
point in the territory. There are, however, also many examples
where territories are tightly packed with no (at least for the
human observer) discernible interstitial space (e.g. Gill and Wolf,
1975; Davies, 1980; Ebersole, 1980; Komdeur and Edelaar, 2001;
Adler and Gordon, 2003). In these cases it is difﬁcult to see why
‘‘switching’’ between territories should be costly.
It is, however, imaginable that the frequency with which
individuals can move back and forth between their own and a
neighbour’s territory is directly limited by the individuals’
movement speed or the food resource’s handling time. As can
bee seen in Fig. 1 this can be sufﬁcient to make defence
evolutionarily stable. This also gives us an interesting relationship
which could be testable by cross-species comparison.
In addition a decrease of detection rate while intruding can
lead to a trade-off between intrusion and ‘‘guarding’’ the territory
(a similar effect has been shown for mate-guarding by Kokko and
Morrell, 2005). This could in some cases stabilise territoriality.
In general our results show that the interactions between
territorial neighbours are economically relevant. This means that
calculations of economic defendability of territories (as done e.g.
by Gill and Wolf, 1975; Carpenter and McMillen, 1976; Houston
et al., 1985) are incomplete in the sense that they have to be
complemented by an analysis which includes the expected
intrusion rate by neighbours. This might lead to very different
results. For example, although our model predicts that in the
territorial case intruders into territories will always be attacked
by the owner, the actual level of intrusion still can vary a lot
depending on resource production, ﬁghting costs and number of
neighbours. In contrast to older models of economic defendability
against ﬂoaters (e.g. Carpenter and McMillen, 1976; Schoener,
1987), in our model even if defence is high individuals can
therefore still lose considerable amounts of their resources to
intruders without, however, that this necessarily makes defence
M. Hinsch, J. Komdeur / Journal of Theoretical Biology 266 (2010) 606–613612unproﬁtable. This might serve as an explanation for the high
levels of reciprocal pilferage found in some food-caching species
(Vander Wall and Jenkins, 2003; Dally et al., 2006).
More generally our results show that ﬂoating intruders do not
pose the only threat to the maintenance of territoriality, an
assumption which underlies most models of the evolution of
territoriality (Adams, 2001). We see that interactions between
neighbours ‘‘per default’’ act as a force destabilising territoriality. In
order to understand the factors which determine the evolutionary
stability of territoriality it is therefore necessary to take the economics
of interactions between neighbours into account. A theory of the
evolution of territoriality needs to be able to explain which
mechanisms maintain the partitioning of space between neighbours.
There are numerous possibilities to extend our basic approach.
There is a wealth of empirical information on the effects of
resource properties such as abundance, distribution or predict-
ability (Maher and Lott, 2000). It would be fairly straightforward
to take these into account in the simulation model and thus test
whether our framework can predict the observed correlations.
Our model is fairly simple in terms of ‘‘game-theoretic
structure’’. It has been shown for simple conﬂict models that for
example variations in ﬁghting ability, access to information about
the opponent or the ability to change the behaviour in repeated
interactions can have tremendous effects on the outcome (e.g.
Leimar and Enquist, 1984; van Doorn et al., 2003). It can certainly
be expected that conﬂicts between territory owners are no
exception to this.
Another very interesting area for future research will be to
integrate our model with other aspect of territorial behaviour.
Additional processes which likely are tightly interlinked with the
direct competition between neighbours are the founding of
territories (Broom et al., 1997; Komdeur and Edelaar, 2001), the
emergence of territory borders (Stamps and Krishnan, 1999;
Lewis and Moorcroft, 2001; Pereira et al., 2003), and the defence
of territories against ﬂoaters (Mesterton-Gibbons, 1992; Eshel and
Sansone, 1995; Lo´pez-Sepulcre and Kokko, 2005).
Finally, every theory requires empirical validation. A number of
detailed data sets on the energy budgets of foraging and territory
defence for example for sunbirds (Gill and Wolf, 1975), honeycree-
pers (Carpenter and McMillen, 1976) and wagtails (Houston et al.,
1985) have been used to test the validity of classical models of
economic defendability. The same data could be used to calculate for
example the expected level of intrusion based on our model.
The work presented here is a ﬁrst step towards a better
understanding of the role defence of territories against theft by
neighbours plays in the evolution of territoriality. It suggests,
however, that trying to understand territorial behaviour in terms
of foraging decisions of individuals rather than competition for
indivisible resources might lead to more general valuable insights.Acknowledgements
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865.03.003.Appendix A. Direction of selection for a

















































































We can now consider the left hand side of the last condition.
Letting N go from 1 to 1 (and taking into account that






always holds, which leads us to conditions (13) to (15) as
described in the main text.Appendix B. No convergence stable a*
Assuming a convergence stable point a*, values of aoa have
to result in a positive selection gradient, whereas the selection
gradient for values a4a has to be negative. Therefore condition
(A4) has to be fulﬁlled for values smaller than and not fulﬁlled for
values greater than a*.









As the reader can easily verify the derivative with respect to a
of the left hand side is always positive, therefore if the condition
holds for a given value a0 it will also hold for all a4a0. Thus no
convergence stable value a* can exist.
References
Adams, E.S., 2001. Approaches to the study of territory size and shape. Annu. Rev.
Ecol. Syst. 32, 277–303.
Adler, F., Gordon, D., 2003. Optimization, conﬂict, and nonoverlapping foraging
ranges in ants. Am. Nat. 162 (5), 529–543.
Broom, M., Cannings, C., Vicker, G.T., 1997. A sequential-arrivals model of territory
acquisition. J. Theor. Biol. 189, 257–272.
M. Hinsch, J. Komdeur / Journal of Theoretical Biology 266 (2010) 606–613 613Brown, J.L., 1964. The evolution of diversity in avian territorial systems. Wil. Bull.
76 (2), 160–169.
Carpenter, F.L., McMillen, R.E., 1976. Threshold model of feeding territoriality and
test with a hawaiian honeycreeper. Science 194, 639–642.
Dally, J.M., Clayton, N.S., Emery, N.J., 2006. The behaviour and evolution of cache
protection and pilferage. Anim. Behav. 72, 13–23.
Davies, N.B., 1980. The economics of territorial behaviour in birds. Ardea 68,
63–74.
Davies, N.B., Houston, A.I., 1981. Owners and satellites: the economics of territory
defence in the pied wagtail, Motacilla alba. J. Anim. Ecol. 50 (1), 157–180.
Ebersole, J.P., 1980. Food density and territory size: an alternative model and a test
on the reef ﬁsh Eupomacentrus leucostictus. Am. Nat. 115, 492–509.
Eshel, I., Sansone, E., 1995. Owner-intruder conﬂict, grafen effect and self-
assessment. The bourgois principle re-examined. J. Theor. Biol. 177, 341–356.
Geritz, S., Kisdi, E., Meszena, G., Metz, J., 1998. Evolutionarily singular strategies
and the adaptive growth and branching of the evolutionary tree. Evol. Ecol. 12,
35–57.
Gill, F., Wolf, L., 1975. Economics of feeding territoriality in the golden-winged
sunbird. Ecology 56 (2), 333–345.
Gill, F., Wolf, L., 1979. Nectar loss by golden-winged sunbirds to competitors. Auk
96, 448–461.
Gill, F., Wolf, L., 1977. Nonrandom foraging by sunbirds in a patchy environment.
Ecology 58 (6), 1284–1296.
Gintis, H., 2007. The evolution of private property. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 64, 1–16.
Hixon, M.A., 1980. Food production and competitor density as the determinants of
feeding territory size. Am. Nat. 115, 510–530.
Houston, A.I., McCleery, R.H., Davies, N.B., 1985. Territory size, prey renewal and
feeding rates: interpetation of observations on the pied wagtail (Motacilla alba)
by simulation. J. Anim. Ecol. 54, 227–240.
Huston, M., DeAngelis, D., Post, W., 1988. New computer models unify ecological
theory. Bioscience 38 (10), 683–691.
Kokko, H., Morrell, L., 2005. Mate guarding, male attractiveness, and paternity
under social monogamy. Behav. Ecol. 16, 724–731.
Komdeur, J., Edelaar, P., 2001. Male seychelles warblers use territory budding to
maximize lifetime ﬁtness in a saturated environment. Behav. Ecol. 12 (6),
706–715.
Lo´pez-Sepulcre, A., Kokko, H., 2005. Territorial defense, territory size, and
population regulation. Am. Nat. 166 (3), 317–329.
Leimar, O., Enquist, M., 1984. Effects of asymmetries in owner-intruder conﬂicts.
J. Theor. Biol. 111, 457–491.Lewis, M.A., Moorcroft, P., 2001. Ess analysis of mechanistic models for
territoriality: the value of scent marks in spatial resource partitioning.
J. Theor. Biol. 210, 449–461.
Maher, C.R., Lott, D.F., 1995. Deﬁnitions of territoriality used in the study of
variation in vertebrate spacing systems. Anim. Behav. 49, 1581–1597.
Maher, C.R., Lott, D.F., 2000. A review of ecological determinants of territoriality
within vertebrate species. Am. Midl. Nat. 143 (1), 1–29.
Maynard Smith, J., 1982. Evolution and The Theory of Games. Cambridge
University Press.
Maynard Smith, J., Parker, G.A., 1976. The logic of asymmetric contests. Anim.
Behav. 24, 159–175.
Malthus, T., 1798. An essay on the principle of population as it affects the future
improvement of society with remarks on the speculations of Mr. Godwin, M.
Condorcet, and other writers, London, 1798.
Mesterton-Gibbons, M., 1992. Ecotypic variation in the asymmetric hawk-dove game:
when is bourgeois an evolutionarily stable strategy? Evol. Ecol. 6 198–222.
Mesterton-Gibbons, M., Adams, E.S., 2003. Landmarks in territory partitioning: a
strategically stable convention? Am. Nat. 161 (5) 685–697.
Morrell, L.J., Kokko, H., 2005. Bridging the gap between mechanistic and adaptive
explanations of territory formation. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 57, 381–390.
Parker, G.A., Knowlton, N., 1980. The evolution of territory size—some ess models.
J. Theor. Biol. 84, 445–476.
Pereira, H.M., Bergmann, A., Roughgarden, J., 2003. Socially stable territories: the
negotiation of space by interacting foragers. Am. Nat. 161 (1), 143–152.
Possingham, H., 1989. The distribution and abundance of resources encountered
by a forager. Am. Nat. 133 (1), 42.
Schoener, T.W., 1987. Time budgets and territory size: simultaneous optimization
models for energy maximizers. Am. Zool. 27, 259–291.
Stamps, J.A., Krishnan, V.V., 1999. A learning-based model of territory establish-
ment. Q. Rev. Biol. 74, 291–318.
Switzer, P.V., Stamps, J.A., Mangel, M., 2001. When should a territory resident
attack? Anim. Behav. 62 749–759.
Vander Wall, S.B., Jenkins, S.H., 2003. Reciprocal pilferage and the evolution of
food-hoarding behavior. Behav. Ecol. 14 (5), 656–667.
van Doorn, G.S., Hengeveld, G.M., Weissing, F.J., 2003. The evolution of social
dominance I: two-player models. Behaviour 140, 1305–1332.
Waser, P.M., 1981. Sociality or territorial defense? The inﬂuence of resource
renewal. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 8, 231–237.
Yee, K., 2003. Ownership and trade from evolutionary games. Int. Rev. Law Econ.
23 (2), 183–197.
